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HIRING SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS:
PROBING THE IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE
BETWEEN JUDGES AND JUSTICES
LAWRENCE BAUM*
Since the 1970s, the overwhelming majority of Supreme Court law
clerks have had prior experience clerking in lower courts, primarily the
federal courts of appeals. Throughout that period, there has been a
tendency for Justices to take clerks from lower court judges who share the
Justices’ ideological tendencies, in what can be called an ideological
linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks.
However, that tendency became considerably stronger between the 1970s
and 1990s, and it has remained very strong since the 1990s.
This Article probes the sources of that alteration in the Justices’
selection of law clerks. Although no definitive conclusions are possible,
two developments seem to be responsible for the change. The first is
growing ideological polarization among political elites, which has given
Justices stronger incentives to seek out law clerks whose policy
preferences are similar to those of the Justices. The second is a pair of
changes in applications for Supreme Court clerkships: a massive increase
in the numbers of applicants and the development of a practice in which
applicants apply to all nine Justices. These changes give the Justices more
reason to use the identity of the judge with whom an applicant has clerked
as a source of information about the applicant’s policy preferences. Thus,
it appears that a major change in the character of American politics has
combined with changes in clerkship applications to bring about a
strengthening of the ideological linkage between judges and Justices in
clerk selection.

* Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Ohio State University. This Article draws
from ideas developed in collaborations with Corey Ditslear and with Neal Devins, and I
benefited from the excellent research assistance of Cara Schaefer. I appreciate valuable
suggestions from Artemus Ward and Orin Kerr.

334

I.
II.
III.
IV.

V.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:333

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 334
PATTERNS OF IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE .......................................... 336
BASES FOR IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE ............................................... 339
EXPLAINING THE STRENGTHENED LINKAGE ................................ 343
A. The Case for Polarization as an Explanation ........................... 347
B. The Case for a More Complex Explanation ............................. 351
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................... 359

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1970s, nearly all law clerks who serve in the Supreme
Court have had prior experience clerking for judges on other courts.1
Since the mid-1990s, these prior clerkships have been heavily
concentrated in the federal courts of appeals.2 Throughout the period
1. See Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 61–62 (2008).
2. Lawrence Baum & Corey Ditslear, Supreme Court Clerkships and “Feeder” Judges,
31 JUST. SYS. J. 26, 26 (2010). In the 1975–1984 Terms, 86% of the Supreme Court law clerks
with lower court experience had worked most recently in the federal courts of appeals. The
comparable proportions for later decades were 88% in the 1985–1994 Terms, 98% in the
1995–2004 Terms, and 96% in the 2005–2014 Terms. These figures are from analysis of a
dataset on the backgrounds of Supreme Court law clerks who served in the 1975–2014 Terms
[hereinafter Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds], one that Corey Ditslear and I compiled from
two sets of documents on the backgrounds of law clerks provided by the Supreme Court, the
“Law Clerk Report by Justices” (used for the 1975–1991 Terms) and “Law Clerks—October
Term [xxxx]: Law Schools and Prior Clerkships” (used for the 1992–2014 Terms). The “Law
Clerk Report by Justices” does not include information on some prior clerkships, and other
sources were checked to identify lower court clerkships for Supreme Court clerks who had no
such clerkships listed.
When law clerks worked with more than one lower court judge, the Supreme Court’s
datasheets in recent years (including the 2010–2014 Terms) have listed only one judge,
ordinarily the one with the most recent clerkship, and that clerkship was used in the Dataset
on Clerks’ Backgrounds and treated as the most recent one for clerks with multiple lowercourt clerkships. It is possible that in some instances the clerkship listed in the Court’s
datasheets and, thus included in the Dataset, is not the most recent one for a Supreme Court
clerk. In some earlier years the Court’s datasheets listed multiple judges with whom a clerk
worked; in those instances, the most recent clerkship was included in the Dataset. Law clerks
who worked with multiple Justices were counted only for the first Justice with whom they
served. Clerks who worked with a court of appeals judge and then with the same person as a
Supreme Court Justice were not counted. Nor were clerks who worked with retired Justices.
It should be noted that because only a single judge is included in the Dataset for each clerk,
and because not all missing data could be filled in from other sources, the numbers of
Supreme Court clerks that are given for specific lower-court judges later in the Article might
be slight undercounts. See infra notes 35–37, 42. Although it appears that there were few
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from the mid-1970s to the present, there has been a tendency for liberal
Justices to hire clerks whose lower court service was with liberal judges
and a corresponding tendency for conservative Justices.3 This tendency,
which I will call an ideological linkage between judges and Justices in
the selection of law clerks, grew considerably stronger over time, with
the largest increase coming in the early 1990s.4 It has remained very
strong since that time.5
This Article explores the reasons for this strengthening. Why have
Justices become more inclined to draw law clerks from ideologically
similar judges? This change in the Justices’ approach to the selection of
law clerks provides a window on the Court as an institution and the way
it has evolved.
The Article does not reach a firm conclusion about the sources of
this change because the implications of the available evidence are
uncertain. But I suggest that two intertwined factors are responsible for
the change. One factor is the growing ideological polarization of elite
groups in American society, polarization that affects the thinking of
Supreme Court Justices, lower court judges, and aspirants to clerkships.6
The other factor is growth in the numbers of applications for clerkships
that each Justice receives and one specific source of that growth: the
development of a practice in which prospective clerks apply to all nine
Justices.7
In Part II, I describe the existence and strengthening of the
ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law
clerks. In Part III, I discuss reasons why an ideological linkage might
exist. In Part IV, I examine the evidence on explanations for the
strengthening of this ideological linkage and offer a tentative judgment
on the sources of that development. In Part V, I briefly discuss the
implications of the strengthening of the ideological linkage.

errors in the listings of prior clerkships in the two sets of Supreme Court documents, any
errors that do exist could affect the numbers of clerks for specific judges as well as the data in
Table 1 infra.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. PATTERNS OF IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE
In 2001, Corey Ditslear and I reported a study of the relationship
between the ideological positions of Supreme Court Justices and the
positions of the judges from whom they drew their clerks in the 1975–
1998 Terms.8 Using two measures of the Justices’ ideological positions
and two measures of the judges’ positions, and controlling for the
partisan composition of the courts of appeals, we found a strong and
statistically significant relationship between judges and Justices.9 In
other words, the more liberal the Justice, the more liberal the lower
court judges whose clerks the Justice chose.
This finding was not surprising. But it was striking that by all our
measures of ideology, the ideological linkage between judges and
Justices became much stronger over time, with the last part of our study
period (the 1993–1998 Terms) standing out from earlier parts.10 When
we analyzed clerk selection by individual Justices over time, we found
that the strengthening of the ideological linkage reflected both
differences between the selection practices of Justices who came on to
the Court in the late 1980s and early 1990s and those of their
predecessors, and changes in the practices of Justices who had joined the
Court prior to the late 1980s.11
In a second study, reported in 2010, we focused on the Justices’
relationships with “feeder” judges who supplied substantial numbers of
law clerks (for most purposes, ten clerks in a decade) to the Supreme
Court.12 Our analytic approach was designed for periods of stable
membership on the Court, so our primary comparison was between the
1976–1985 Terms (when eight Justices served throughout the period)

8. Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Research Note, Selection of Law Clerks and
Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001).
9. Id. at 873–75. This study and a follow-up study that focused on “feeder” judges
analyzed the hiring of individual clerks by Justices. See Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2. A
useful alternative approach is to consider the attributes of the sets of clerks that a Justice
hires in a given Term. See Christopher D. Kromphardt, Fielding an Excellent Team: Law
Clerk Selection and Chambers Structure at the U.S. Supreme Court, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 289,
298–301 (2014).
10. Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 875–77. When the ideological positions of court
of appeals judges were measured by the party of the appointing president, “there was a fairly
sharp break: beginning with the 1992 term, the relationship between judges’ and justices’
ideological positions was consistently at a level of strength that was matched by few prior
terms.” Id. at 882.
11. Id. at 880–82.
12. Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2.
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and the 1995–2004 Terms (when nine Justices served throughout the
period).13 We used four measures of judges’ ideological positions and
four measures of Justices’ positions.14 When we examined only those
clerks whom the Justices drew from feeder judges, the ideological
linkage between judges and Justices was only moderately strong in the
1976–1985 Terms.15
In the 1995–2004 Terms, in contrast, the
relationships were very strong.16 Compared with the earlier period,
feeder judges were sending clerks to smaller subsets of Justices, and
those subsets overwhelmingly were composed of Justices who shared
the judges’ ideological tendencies.17
The ideological linkage in the selection of law clerks has remained
strong since those studies were carried out.18 Table 1 shows the
proportion of each Justice’s law clerks in the 2010–2014 Terms who had
worked most recently with a judge appointed by a Democratic
president, an imperfect but quite meaningful measure of judges’
ideological positions.19 The gap between the four liberal Justices
appointed by Democratic presidents and the five conservative Justices
appointed by Republicans is striking. So are the very low percentages
for all five conservative Justices, who were distinctly less likely to choose
clerks who had worked with lower court judges from the opposite party
than were their liberal colleagues. In the 2010–2014 Terms, 32.1% of
the clerks for the four liberal Justices came from Republican judges,
while 8.0% of the clerks for the five conservative Justices came from

13. Id. at 28. We did not include the first Term in these two periods of stable
membership because Justices’ approach to clerk selection in the first Term often differs from
their approach in later Terms. Id. at 28 n.1.
14. Id. at 36–37.
15. Id. at 37.
16. Id. at 37–38.
17. Id. at 38–40.
18. See William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The
Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1766–68, 1775–80 (2009); Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court’s Polarization:
Choice of Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at A1; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Difference
Between Conservative and Liberal Justices, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2013, 7:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-difference-between-co_b_4205674.html
(last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 10:52 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/TRU4-BZRS.
19. However, because of partisan “sorting,” which has made each party more
ideologically homogeneous, some caution is needed in interpreting changes in the
relationship between judges’ party affiliations and the ideological positions of the Justices to
whom they supply clerks. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Democratic judges.20 Indeed, prior to the 2013 Term, Clarence Thomas
as a Supreme Court Justice apparently had never hired a clerk who had
worked with a Democratic-appointed judge.21 When Justice Thomas
broke that perfect record, it was with a clerk who had been president of
the Yale Federalist Society.22
Table 1
Percentages of Justices’ Law Clerks with Lower Court Clerkships
Who Had Worked with Democratic-Appointed Judges,
2010–2014 Terms23
Justice

Percent

Sotomayor

70.0

Kagan

70.0

Ginsburg

68.4

20. Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2. To a limited degree, the fact that the
conservative Republican Justices hired substantially higher percentages of clerks from fellow
partisans in these five Terms than did their liberal Democratic counterparts might be ascribed
to the higher numbers of Republican appointees in the courts of appeals early in that period.
Maxwell Palmer, Presidential Legacies and Partisan Balance on the Federal Courts 19 tbl.3,
27 fig.7, 29 fig.8 (Nov. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://maxwellpalmer.co
m/research.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4VGY-ZQUE.
However, this difference
between conservative and liberal Justices was essentially unchanged after appointments by
President Obama moved the courts of appeals toward a more even party balance. Id. In the
2013 and 2014 Terms, 32.3% of the clerks for the four liberal Justices came from Republican
judges, while 10.0% of the clerks for the five conservative Justices came from Democratic
judges. Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2. In January 2009, about 60% of the
active court of appeals judges had been appointed by Republican presidents; in January 2013,
the percentage had declined to 51%. Palmer, supra at 29 fig.8.
21. Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2; see also Adam Liptak, The Polarized
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at SR1. Because the Supreme Court’s information sheets
on law clerks list only a single prior clerkship, usually the most recent, it is possible that one
or more of Justice Thomas’s clerks prior to the 2013 Term had served with a Democraticappointed judge at some point. See supra note 2.
22. David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch: The Official List for October Term
2013, ABOVE THE LAW (July 25, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/supremecourt-clerk-hiring-watch-the-official-list-for-october-term-2013/#more-256382, archived at htt
p://perma.cc/NV9Q-HD7A.
23. Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2. One clerk for Justice Breyer and
one clerk for Justice Ginsburg who had served in a state supreme court are not included in
the percentages for them. On possible minor errors in the source documents on which the
Dataset is based, see supra note 2.
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Breyer

63.2

Kennedy

20.0

Roberts

15.0

Thomas

5.0

Alito

0.0

Scalia

0.0
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As a first step in explaining the strengthening of the ideological
linkage between Justices and judges in the selection of law clerks, it is
necessary to consider why any ideological linkage might exist. Why do
Justices draw clerks disproportionately from ideological compatriots in
the lower courts?
III. BASES FOR IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE
The most straightforward reason why Supreme Court Justices might
draw law clerks disproportionately from like-minded lower court judges
is an interest on the part of prospective clerks, judges, and Justices in
working with people who share their conceptions of good legal policy.24
Law students with strong policy preferences might focus their search for
their first clerkships on judges who stand on the same side of the
ideological spectrum. Indeed, there is evidence that at least some
applicants for lower court clerkships take judges’ ideological positions
into account when they apply for clerkships and accept them.25 When
lower court clerks seek promotion to the Supreme Court, they could use
the same criterion to choose where to send their applications.26 The
result would be to create an ideological linkage between the judges and
Justices with whom clerks worked.

24. See Liptak, supra note 18.
25. See Rex Bossert, Clerks’ Route to Top Court, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at A1. But
see Alex Kozinski & Fred Bernstein, Clerkship Politics, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 57, 57–58 (1998)
(Judge Kozinski noting that many prospective clerks do not take judges’ ideological positions
into account).
26. As I will discuss later, applicants for Supreme Court clerkships no longer apply
selectively to the Justices, and that change in practice helps to explain the strengthened
ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks. See infra notes
103–08 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, it is easy to understand why judges and Justices might
prefer to work with law clerks who share their policy preferences. The
role of law clerks in the Supreme Court became increasingly important
over time, especially in the selection of cases to hear and in opinion
writing.27 A Justice wants clerks to act in ways that are consistent with
the Justice’s preferences, and a clerk whose own preferences mirror
those of the Justice is the safest bet from that perspective.28 Caseload
growth in the federal courts of appeals enhanced the role of law clerks
in those courts, and court of appeals judges also have reason to choose
clerks who share their preferences.29 Further, judges and Justices might
want to give the valuable experience and career enhancement of a
clerkship primarily to young lawyers who stand on their own side of the
ideological spectrum.30 Thus, although judges undoubtedly vary in this
respect,31 almost surely there is a tendency for judges and Justices to
choose law clerks whose policy preferences seem fairly close to their
own.32

27. See Liptak, supra note 18.
28. Id.
29. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL:
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 3 (2013); Liptak, supra note 18; Orin
Kerr, Are Feeder Judges Unusually Ideological? If So, Why?, U. CHI. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 28, 20
06), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/09/are_feeder_judg.html, archived at http://p
erma.cc/M5CY-3BNW.
30. Kozinski & Bernstein, supra note 25, at 58 (Judge Kozinski describing his own
desire “to train conservative and libertarian lawyers” and his colleague Stephen Reinhardt’s
corresponding motivation to train “committed liberals”). Orin Kerr has suggested another
incentive: judges might choose clerks from their own side of the ideological spectrum as part
of a strategy to place those clerks with Justices who are also on that side. Personal
Communication with Orin Kerr, Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law, George
Washington Univ. (May 5, 2014); see also Kerr, supra note 29.
31. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 303 (2007) (describing
differences in hiring practices between Justice Samuel Alito and J. Michael Luttig as courts of
appeals judges).
32. See Kerr, supra note 29. In a 2013 survey of courts of appeals judges, the
respondents ranked the political ideology of applicants as the least important of several
possible criteria for the selection of law clerks. Todd C. Peppers, Micheal W. Giles & Bridget
Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes? The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks
in “Appellate Triage,” 98 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 325 tbl.1 (2014). But this finding led the
authors who conducted the survey “to speculate about the level of judicial candor reflected in
[their] completed surveys. Simply put, [they] believe that there is too much ideological
matching between courts of appeals judges and their law clerks to be the result of chance or
applicants applying to like-minded jurists.” Id. at 319.
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To the extent that both judges and Justices use ideology as a
criterion in the selection of clerks, there will be an indirect ideological
linkage between judges and Justices in the selection process. If liberal
judges and Justices both seek liberal clerks, then liberal Justices will
take clerks disproportionately from liberal judges. And this will occur
even if Justices pay no attention to the identity of the judge with whom a
clerk works.33
In practice, Justices undoubtedly do take the identities of lower
court judges into account. For one thing, if judges and prospective
clerks seek each other out partly on the basis of shared policy
preferences, a Justice might use the ideological position of a judge as
one clue to the ideological position of the judge’s clerks. Further, if a
clerk has already completed the lower court clerkship or a substantial
portion of the clerkship when a Justice makes hiring decisions, a lower
court judge who shares a Justice’s ideological views can offer concrete
evidence on the clerk’s own views and the clerk’s willingness to follow
the judge’s lead.
Justices might choose clerks who have worked with judges who are
ideologically similar to the Justices for reasons that relate to those
judges themselves rather than to their clerks. It is natural for Justices to
draw clerks from judges with whom they are acquainted, even more if
they have a friendship with each other. One benefit of going to those
judges is that it is easier for Justices to inquire about a clerk’s qualities
with a judge they know well. Further, judges’ success in placing clerks
with the Supreme Court has intangible benefits in pride and prestige as
well as the tangible benefit of enhancing judges’ ability to attract the
most sought-after clerks,34 so Justices may be inclined to give those
benefits to people they know and like.
The feeder relationships between judges and specific Justices
provide ample evidence of the effect of acquaintanceship. Justices draw
clerks from former court of appeals colleagues,35 former colleagues in
33. The same is true if prospective clerks seek out both judges and Justices on an
ideological basis.
34. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 246–
47 (2010); Bossert, supra note 25 (quoting Judge Kozinski); see also Tony Mauro, Corps of
Clerks Lacking in Diversity, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 12A.
35. To take one example, Justice Stephen Breyer has hired eleven clerks who worked
with Judge Michael Boudin, a colleague of Justice Breyer’s on the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit between 1992 and 1994. Boudin’s and Breyer’s career information is in the
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Michael
Boudin, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=218&cid=999&ctype=n
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law practice,36 and former law clerks of their own.37 In part, the success
of District of Columbia judges in placing clerks with the Supreme
Court38 reflects the advantages of D.C. judges in developing
relationships with Justices.39
The judges whom Justices know and like do not necessarily share
ideological positions with them.40 But there is undoubtedly a tendency
in that direction.41 Future judges and Justices sometimes get to know
a&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FUP2-R9US;
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Stephen Gerald Breyer, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://w
ww.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=255&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S7T3-FN7F. The number of Boudin clerks that Justice
Breyer selected is from the Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2 (which also
describes the possibility of a slight undercount).
36. Justice Thurgood Marshall hired at least five clerks who worked with Judge
Spottswood Robinson of the D.C. Circuit, who worked with the NAACP and its Legal
Defense and Educational Fund while in private practice from 1948 to 1960. Justice Marshall
headed the Legal Defense and Educational Fund from 1940 to 1961. Biographical Directory
of Federal Judges: Thurgood Marshall, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInf
o?jid=1489&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.cc/P3G9-WQR9; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Spottswood William Robinson
III, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2031&cid=999&ctype=na&i
nstate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3JCL-BGN5. The number
of Robinson clerks that Justice Marshall selected is from the Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds,
supra note 2 (which also describes the possibility of a slight undercount). One of the five
clerks worked with Justice Marshall in the 1974 Term, prior to the beginning date for the
Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, and Justice Marshall might have hired other Robinson
clerks in earlier Terms for which the Supreme Court’s datasheet “Law Clerk Report by
Justices” did not list prior clerkships.
37. Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, who worked with Judge Anthony Kennedy of
the Ninth Circuit as clerk in 1975–1976, has provided twenty-six clerks to Kennedy as a
Justice. Former Fourth Circuit Judge J. Michael Luttig, who worked with Judge Antonin
Scalia of the D.C. Circuit as clerk in 1982–1983, provided fifteen clerks to Scalia as a Justice.
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Alex Kozinski, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.g
ov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1314&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/CW3F-F7X8; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: J. Michael
Luttig, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1443&cid=999&ctype=na
&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F6JW-T9YM. The
numbers of clerks are from the Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2 (which also
describes the possibility of slight undercounts).
38. In the 1975–2014 Terms, 36% of all the Supreme Court law clerks whose most
recent clerkship was in a federal court of appeals came from the D.C. Circuit. Dataset on
Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2. The next highest percentage was 14% from the Second
Circuit. Id.
39. The prestige of the D.C. Circuit is also a factor. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L.
WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 80 (2006).
40. See Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 871.
41. Id.
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each other in an ideologically defined setting such as a presidential
administration or a political group. Further, people with strong views
about public policy are drawn disproportionately to others who share
those views.
Acquaintanceship aside, Justices may be inclined to choose clerks on
the basis of their respect for the judges with whom those clerks serve.
To take the most prominent example, that respect surely helps to
explain the number of clerks for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit who have gone on to the Supreme
Court.42 The esteem in which Justices hold other judges may be colored
by their agreement or disagreement with those judges on matters of
judicial policy.
Thus, there is a multiplicity of bases for an ideological linkage
between judges and Justices in the clerk selection process. In light of
the number of bases, it would be extraordinary if that linkage did not
exist. These bases provide a starting point for examination of the
reasons why the ideological linkage has strengthened over time.
IV. EXPLAINING THE STRENGTHENED LINKAGE
Why did Supreme Court Justices become more inclined to draw
their law clerks from judges who shared the Justices’ general ideological
positions in the 1990s, and why have they maintained that stronger
inclination since then? The most intriguing possibility is the growth in
ideological polarization among political elites in the United States.
The term polarization has been used to refer to multiple
phenomena.43 One is “sorting,” in which ideological differences become
more fully aligned with other differences between people, especially
political party identifications and affiliations. Considerable sorting of
liberals into the Democratic Party and conservatives into the
Republican Party has taken place in the mass public44 and a great deal of
42. Twenty-six Posner clerks have served in the Supreme Court. Dataset on Clerks’
Backgrounds, supra note 2 (which also describes the possibility of a slight undercount). Judge
Posner’s standing is discussed in Christopher C. McCurdy & Ryan P. Thompson, The Power
of Posner: A Study of Prestige and Influence in the Federal Judiciary, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 49
(2011).
43. On different aspects of polarization and the evidence of their existence at the elite
and mass levels, see MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS, DISCONNECT: THE
BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2009); Marc J. Hetherington,
Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 413 (2009).
44. There is considerable evidence of sorting in the mass public. See MATTHEW
LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND
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sorting has occurred among people in government and other people who
are involved in politics.45 In Congress, the sorting began in the 1950s
and 1960s, and it is now complete: in the Congresses of 2009–2010 and
2011–2012, in both the House and Senate every Democrat had a more
liberal voting record than every Republican.46 Similarly, since the
retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010, the Supreme Court for
the first time has had ideological blocs that follow party lines (based on
the party of the appointing president) perfectly.47 To the extent that
partisan divisions reinforce ideological divisions, the Court’s liberal and
conservative Justices are separated from each other to a greater extent
than in the past.48
In itself, partisan sorting could not explain the strengthened
ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law

CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS (2009); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman,
Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion,
114 AM. J. SOC. 408 (2008); see also Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political
Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563, 577–82 (2008) (discussing
the evidence and disagreements about the extent of the sorting that has occurred).
45. Baldassarri & Gelman, supra note 44, at 413.
46. On congressional sorting generally, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE &
HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL
RICHES 15–70 (2006); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008).
The relative positions of Republican and Democratic members in 2009–2012 were
determined from “DW-Nominate” scores for members of Congress, also known as PooleRosenthal scores, that are calculated from agreements and disagreements between members
in congressional votes. Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole &
Howard Rosenthal, DW-Nominate Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEW,
http://pooleandrosenthal.com/dwnominate.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/YQ2U-M8RL (describing the scores and presenting the data).
47. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court 7–10 (William & Mary Law Sch., Research Paper No.
09-276, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432111, archived at http://perma.cc/DS9X
-VFEN. There has been no other time when there were sizable conservative and liberal blocs
on the Court that followed party lines and only one ambiguous instance in which all the
Court’s Democratic appointees were to the left of all the Republican appointees. Id. at 10–
27. In the 1941–1944 Terms, the Justice with the most conservative voting position on the
Court (Owen Roberts) was the only “pure” Republican appointee on the Court; Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, originally appointed to the Court by Republican Calvin Coolidge and
elevated to chief by Democrat Franklin Roosevelt, had the second most conservative position
in two of the four Terms. Id. at 18 tbl.2, 21. The Justices’ places on a liberal–conservative
scale for the 1937–2012 Terms were determined from their Martin-Quinn scores, a
transformation of their voting agreements and disagreements. Id. at 16. The scores are
described and archived at Martin-Quinn Scores, BERKELEY L., http://mqscores.berkeley.edu
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/MZA5-KKBJ.
48. Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 7–27; see also Liptak, supra note 18.
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clerks.49 More relevant is another type of polarization: growth in the
strength of people’s identifications with one ideological side and in their
antipathy toward the other side. This second type has been called
“affective polarization.”50
It is uncertain whether affective ideological polarization has
occurred in the mass public,51 but there are clear signs of it among
political elites.52 One reason is that, with the two parties more
ideologically distinct, partisan loyalties and interests reinforce
ideological disagreements.53 In any event, there is now an extraordinary
degree of enmity and distrust between conservatives and liberals.54
Justice Scalia has described one result:
It’s a nasty time. When I was first in Washington, and even in
my early years on this Court, I used to go to a lot of dinner
parties at which there were people from both sides. Democrats,
Republicans. Katharine Graham used to have dinner parties
49. Partisan sorting could explain a growing tendency of Justices to go to judges
appointed by presidents of their own party as sources of clerks: if the ideological linkage
remained at the same strength but the political parties became more homogeneous
ideologically, the proportion of clerks that Justices drew from judges of the same party would
increase. But the studies of ideological linkage did not use party affiliation (or party of the
appointing president) as a measure of the Justices’ ideological positions, and the linkage
strengthened over time whether lower court judges’ positions were measured by the party of
the appointing president or by other measures. Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2, at 37–38;
Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 875–76.
It is also noteworthy that the most prominent feeder judges since the 1990s seem less
moderate in their views than their counterparts in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the
feeders of the earlier period, see Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2, at 37–39. On the feeders
since the 1980s, see David J. Garrow, Acolytes in Arms, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 411, 417–18 (2006)
(reviewing PEPPERS, supra note 95; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 59). But see Kerr, supra
note 29, disagreeing in part with Garrow’s characterization of these judges. In conjunction
with the strengthened tendency of conservative and liberal Justices to draw their clerks from
different feeder judges, this change provides additional evidence that something more than
partisan sorting is involved in the changing linkage between judges and Justices in the
selection of law clerks.
50. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social
Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 406 (2012). These authors
focused on affect as a source of partisan polarization, distinguishing it from ideology, but
affect is relevant to ideological polarization as well. See id.
51. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes see ideology as largely irrelevant to the growth in
affective polarization along partisan lines. Id. at 421–24.
52. See id. at 405–06.
53. Id. at 421.
54. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM 44–51, 55–67 (2012).
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that really were quite representative of Washington. It doesn’t
happen anymore.55
This development is reflected in, and reinforced by, the
establishment of new ideologically based institutions. In the mass
media, television networks and websites cater separately to liberals and
conservatives. In the legal profession, the Federalist Society and (more
recently) the American Constitution Society provide separate homes for
conservative and liberal law students, lawyers, and even judges.
If the thinking of Justices, judges, and prospective law clerks has
changed as a result of affective polarization, the result would be to
strengthen the ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the
selection of law clerks in multiple ways. For one thing, law students who
have stronger identifications with one ideological side would give
greater weight to the ideological positions of lower court judges when
they seek clerkships.56 Justices would also have reason to worry more
about the danger of hiring clerks who seek to advance their own
ideological agendas, so they would have a stronger incentive to seek
clerks who share the Justices’ own views.57
Further, if judges have stronger ideological identities than they did
in the past, they too give greater weight to ideology in the selection of
clerks. In combination with clerks’ own choices about where to apply
for clerkships, this change in behavior makes a judge’s identity a better
indicator of clerks’ ideological positions for Justices who care about
those positions.
Especially intriguing is the possibility that Justices’ own perspectives
have changed. If Justices have become more conscious of ideology, they
have stronger incentives to choose law clerks who share their ideological
positions. In turn, they have more reason to draw clerks from the lower
court judges whose own ideological positions provide information about
clerks’ positions. Former U.S. Court of Appeals Judge J. Michael Luttig
has argued that these changes have indeed occurred, ascribing them to

55. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 14, 2013, at 22,
27. Katharine Graham was publisher and chaired the board of the Washington Post.
56. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
57. In the 1990s, one judge on a federal court of appeals expressed his concern about
“the risk of staff disloyalty” from law clerks who disagree with the judges with whom they
work, citing examples passed along by other judges. Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Politicization:
From the Law Schools to the Courts, 7 ACAD. QUESTIONS 9, 16 (1994). Judge Kleinfeld
linked such behavior to “politicization” of law schools. Id. at 13.
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what he calls politicization of the courts.58 Justices would also have
more interest in rewarding ideologically similar lower court judges by
choosing their clerks. Finally, the Justices might be more likely to
develop acquaintanceships with judges and accord respect to them on
the basis of ideological compatibility.
Thus, affective ideological polarization provides a potentially
powerful explanation for the strengthened ideological linkage between
judges and Justices in the selection of Supreme Court law clerks. The
evidence on whether the changes associated with affective polarization
have actually occurred is fragmentary, but that evidence can be used to
reach tentative conclusions about the validity of an explanation based
on polarization.
A. The Case for Polarization as an Explanation
There is no systematic evidence on ideological thinking among
applicants for clerkships and among those who actually serve in the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. But it seems certain that law
students and young lawyers in the most prestigious law schools have
been affected by the growth in ideological polarization.
The
establishment of the Federalist Society in the 1980s59 undoubtedly
strengthened the ideological identities of conservative law students, and
the same has been true of liberals and the American Constitution
Society in the past decade.60 Indeed, some of the law clerks who have
worked with the conservative Justices since the 1980s were already
visible participants in conservative politics by the time they came to the
Court.61
As the hypothesis of greater ideological consciousness might suggest,
accounts from the 1988 and 2000 Terms of the Court depict strong
rivalries between sets of conservative and liberal law clerks.62 Although
58. Liptak, supra note 18.
59. On the development of the Federalist Society, see MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE
MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK
FROM LIBERALS (2013); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 135–80 (2008).
60. On the American Constitution Society, see Charlie Savage, Liberal Legal Group is
Following New Administration’s Path to Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at A30.
61. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
62. The 1988 Term is discussed in EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE
FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 263–
71 (1998). Some commentators have questioned Lazarus’s depiction of the Court and of the
clerks’ role, though not (to my knowledge) the existence of ideological rivalries among the
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such accounts must be interpreted with caution, they are consistent with
the possibility that law clerks in the Court act more deliberately to
advance legal policies they favor than in the past. If so, Justices have a
strong incentive to choose clerks who will be on their own side of the
divide.
It seems reasonable to posit that ideological thinking among lower
court judges, and specifically judges on the federal courts of appeals, has
also strengthened. In selecting judges, presidents today generally give
more emphasis to the policy preferences of prospective nominees than
they did in the mid-twentieth century.63 Responding in part to activists
in their party coalitions, the Reagan Administration and its successors
have elevated policy considerations in their criteria for selection of
judges.64 One indication is the importance of Federalist Society
membership as a qualification for Republican nominees.65 Both for this
reason, and because of the ideological polarization that has occurred all
around them, judges on the courts of appeals in the current era are more
ideologically committed as a group than were their predecessors in
earlier eras.
Similarly, Justices of the current era surely have been affected by
ideological polarization.66 For one thing, the forces that have led recent
presidents to choose Justices who share their parties’ now-dominant
ideological orientations have also led to the selection of Justices whose
liberalism or conservatism is deeply rooted.67 This development is
especially clear on the Republican side. Chief Justice John Roberts and
clerks. See Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents? What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to
Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 193–
211, 218–219, 221 (2000) (book review). The 2000 Term is discussed in David Margolick,
Evgenia Peretz & Michael Shnayerson, The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310,
320.
63. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 28, 46 (2005).
64. See id. at 51.
65. Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal
Judiciary, 62 POL. RES. Q. 366, 367–68, 375 (2009). One commentator, in 1998, reported his
observation that some Republican appointees in the federal judiciary were affiliated with the
Federalist Society and that they and their Federalist-affiliated law clerks “form a loose knit
ideological unity within the court system.” Lawrence E. Walsh, The Future of the
Independent Counsel Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1379, 1389.
66. The impact of polarization on the Court, including some of the effects discussed
here, is analyzed in Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion,
Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L.J. 661, 693–704
(2013).
67. See id.
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Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito were all
highly committed conservatives when they were chosen as Justices.68
Further, ideological polarization among political and social elites has
changed the environment in which Justices live and work.69 To a great
extent, that environment has bifurcated. As noted earlier, there are now
separate segments of the mass media and the legal elite on the left and
right, and law schools differ sharply in their ideological orientations. As
Justice Scalia pointed out, even socializing in Washington, D.C. now
tends to be within ideological subgroups.70 As a result, it is easier for
Justices to live in an environment consisting primarily of people who
share their own views.71
Indeed, the strongly conservative members of today’s Court have
had significant ties with conservatives outside the Court. Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, all members of the
Federalist Society before their appointments to the Court, have each
participated in Society events multiple times as Justices, and Chief
Justice John Roberts also has links to the Society.72 Justices Scalia and
Thomas frequently appear before other conservative groups as well.73
Justice Scalia’s deep conservative roots include a role in founding the
Federalist Society,74 and he has indicated his disdain for what he regards
as the orthodoxy of a liberal elite.75 For his part, Justice Thomas has

68. Based on references to Supreme Court nominees’ ideological positions in
newspaper editorials, all four of these Justices were perceived as highly conservative. On a
scale of 0 (very conservative) to 1 (very liberal), Justice Scalia was rated at .000, Justice
Thomas at .160, Justice Roberts at .120, and Justice Alito at .100. The scores, calculated by
Jeffrey Segal, are in the table Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court
Nominees, 1937–2012. JEFFREY SEGAL, PERCEIVED QUALIFICATIONS AND IDEOLOGY OF
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES: 1937−2012, available at http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/
polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PGC5-S3QG. The derivation and
use of the scores are discussed in Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 560 tbl.1 (1989).
69. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71. Of course, even in the past it was possible for Justices to do so. On Justice Brennan
in the 1970s, see STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 34, at 425.
72. Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 64–67; see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Absolutist,
NEW YORKER, June 30, 2014, at 34, 44 (discussing Justice Alito).
73. Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 64–66.
74. TELES, supra note 59, at 141.
75. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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openly expressed his bitterness toward what he sees as a liberal
establishment.76
As Table 1 shows, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy all
take their clerks preponderantly from Republican appointees in the
lower courts.77 The clerks for each of the four Justices have included
people who already had visible involvement in conservative causes.78
During much of his tenure on the Court, those who help Justice
Kennedy select clerks have made a considerable effort to screen out
applicants with liberal views.79 Justice Scalia has been open to clerks
with liberal views, but he recently expressed his view that it is difficult to
find liberals who are willing to follow his jurisprudential approach.80
Justice Thomas has argued that it is pointless for him to select clerks
who disagree with his conservative views,81 and he has explained his
preference for conservative judges as sources of clerks by saying that
choosing clerks is like “selecting mates [for] a foxhole.”82
The links between liberal Justices and liberal groups outside the
Court have not been as prominent. In part, this is because some
important institutions that do not have an explicit ideological
76. Jeffrey Toobin, The Burden of Clarence Thomas, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at
38, 39–40; see also Neil A. Lewis, 2 Years After His Bruising Hearing, Justice Thomas Can
Rarely Be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at 7.
77. See supra Table 1.
78. Al Kamen, Scalia’s Federalist from Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1986, at A23;
Adam Liptak, New Clerk for Alito Has a Long Paper Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at C14;
Tony Mauro, A New Clerk, a “Vanilla” Face, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1988, at 16 (discussing
Justice Kennedy); Toobin, supra note 76, at 46–47 (discussing Justice Thomas).
79. Margolick et al., supra note 62, at 320; Jack Newfield, The Right’s Judicial
Juggernaut, NATION, Oct. 7, 2002, at 11, 15. In the 2002 confirmation hearings for Miguel
Estrada, nominated to a seat on the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, reports that
Estrada had blocked liberal candidates for clerkships with Justice Kennedy were raised by
Democratic senators and largely denied by Estrada. Confirmation Hearings on Federal
Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 779–80, 802–03,
805–08 (2002).
80. Senior, supra note 55, at 28.
81. Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, Culling the Reputable, Reliable, RightLeaning: For “Family” of Clerks, Thomas Weighs Politics, Loyalty and, Sometimes, HardLuck History, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A11 (“I’m not going to hire clerks who have
profound disagreements with me . . . . That is a waste of my time. Someone said that is like
trying to train a pig. It’s a waste of your time, and it aggravates the pig.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
82. Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 883. In that source, Justice Thomas is quoted as
referring to “mates in a foxhole”; that was my error in transcribing the quotation from my
notes on Justice Thomas’s response to a question in an appearance at Texas A & M
University, Oct. 22, 1999. See id at 833 n.7.
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orientation, such as the American Bar Association, are friendly to
liberal views.83 But the involvement of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor in the American Constitution
Society84 is a sign that the liberal Justices, too, orient themselves toward
a liberal audience. And as dean of Harvard Law School, Justice Elena
Kagan made her perspective clear when she told a national student
convention of the Federalist Society, “I love the Federalist Society” but
added, “[y]ou are not my people.”85
Thus, there is reason to think that affective ideological polarization
among American elites has helped to reorient the Justices’ criteria for
selection of clerks. On average, prospective law clerks, lower court
judges, and the Justices themselves almost surely are more committed to
conservatism or liberalism than their counterparts in earlier eras.86 That
commitment inevitably affects the selection of law clerks, including the
Justices’ consideration of the identities of the judges with whom those
clerks worked. It is noteworthy that conservative Justices have an
especially strong tendency to choose clerks from judges on their side of
the ideological divide because ideological consciousness seems
especially strong among conservative Justices.
Thus, affective
polarization is a persuasive explanation for the strengthening of the
ideological link between judges and Justices.
B. The Case for a More Complex Explanation
Though persuasive in itself, an explanation based on polarization
may exaggerate how much Supreme Court Justices and others involved
in the selection of law clerks have changed. To start with, this is hardly
the first era in which some prospective law clerks and lower court judges
have adhered firmly to ideological positions. Certainly that is true of
judges. As people who are politically aware and who generally had
been politically active, federal judges were always likely to have strong
views about policy issues and, in some cases, strong self-identifications

83. Adam Liptak, As the Bar Gets Its Voice Back on Judges, Advice May Ring Familiar,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, at A14.
84. Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 72 n.331 (discussing Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg); Andrew Hamm, Justice Sotomayor Speaks at ACS Convention, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 24, 2014, 10:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/justice-sotomayor-speaks-atacs-convention/, archived at http://perma.cc/G9KY-JGDN.
85. MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT
90 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 869–80.
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as liberals or conservatives. And if enmity between judges with
different ideological views seems to be a phenomenon of the current
era, it is useful to cite the sharp divide between liberals and
conservatives on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the
1960s.87
What about the Justices? In some important respects, the Court of
the last quarter century does not seem especially polarized by historical
standards. The massive growth in the proportions of non-unanimous
decisions and in the occurrence of separate opinions that began in the
late 1930s was completed by the time the Justices began to draw the
preponderance of their clerks from lower courts in the 1970s.88
Measured by the proportions of their votes that can be characterized as
conservative or liberal, the Justices have not become more divided over
the past quarter century.89 Although the Justices’ frequent references to
a friendly atmosphere in the Court90 might be discounted, there is no

87. That divide was so sharp that a judge who sought to avoid identification with one
camp or the other had to walk to another federal building for lunch to avoid choosing
between the separate groups of conservative and liberal judges in the judges’ dining room.
JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE POWERFUL
FEDERAL JUDGES 253 (1974).
88. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G.
WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS
225–36 (4th ed. 2007) (showing term-by-term proportions of unanimous decisions, decisions
with dissenting opinions, and decisions with concurring opinions); Peppers & Zorn, supra
note 1, at 61–62.
89. The standard deviation measures the spread of a set of numbers, so it provides a
good indication of the variation in the Justices’ proportions of liberal and conservative votes
by Term. There is no clear trend across the 1975–2012 Terms, though there was a slight
decline over time that indicated the Justices were a bit closer to each other in voting
tendencies. The mean of the standard deviations by decade was 15.3% for the 1975–1984
Terms, 15.1% for the 1985–1994 Terms, 14.3% for the 1995–2004 Terms, and 13.5% for the
2005–2012 Terms. Percentages of liberal and conservative votes were calculated from data in
the Supreme Court Database, archived at Washington University. Harold J. Spaeth, Lee
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger & Sara C. Benesh, 2014
Supreme Court Database, Version 2014 Release 01, THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/SD8F-2K9R. The cases analyzed were those in which the Court held oral
arguments; the percentages used to calculate the standard deviation were for the nine Justices
who participated in the largest number of cases in a Term. In a study that covered the 1953–
2004 period, different measures of polarization showed different patterns, but none indicated
a sharp increase in polarization over time. Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological Polarization
on the United States Supreme Court, 62 POL. RES. Q. 146, 150, 152 fig.3 (2009).
90. Senior, supra note 55, at 27 (Justice Scalia: “Everybody I’ve served with on the
Court I’ve regarded as a friend.”); Mike Tolson, Chief Justice Roberts: Technology Among
Top Issues for Court, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct 17, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
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visible evidence that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have had the
very bad interpersonal relations of some past Courts.91
Nor are the Justices of the current era the first to display behavior
that is motivated consciously or unconsciously by ideological
considerations. To take one example, what some observers have read as
a strategic effort by Chief Justice Roberts to move doctrine in a
conservative direction92 could hardly be more conscious or elaborate
than the efforts of Justice William Brennan to win his colleagues’
support for liberal doctrine in an earlier era.93 And if judges and
Justices today are more likely to be acquainted if they share an
ideological position, that tendency surely existed in prior eras as well.
One example was the close relationship between some liberals on the
Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
the 1960s and 1970s.94
The most striking evidence of continuity between current and past
eras comes from the surveys of former law clerks by Todd Peppers and
Christopher Zorn95 and by Artemus Ward and David Weiden,96 surveys
texas/houston/article/Chief-Justice-Roberts-Technology-among-top-3957626.php
(last
updated Oct. 17, 2012, 11:22 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/XX9C-82MC (“We are
extremely close . . . . I was surprised by the extent to which the justices have a collegial
relationship.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kagan Praises Scalia for Work on
Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Dec. 13, 2012,
10:23 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kagan-praises-scalia-work-supreme-court, archived at
http://perma.cc/F5V4-K83V (“Kagan says she loves all her colleagues.”).
91. On the Court of the 1940s, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND
TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 305–06 (2010). Some journalists
have pointed to signs of frictions among the current Justices. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Justices’
Jabs Reveal Ideological Rifts, USA TODAY, May 13, 2014, at 2A; Jan Crawford, Discord at
Supreme Court is Deep, and Personal, CBS NEWS (July 9, 2012, 11:06 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/discord-at-supreme-court-is-deep-and-personal/, archived at
http://perma.cc/BY33-9Z44. But to the extent that these conflicts exist, they seem to pale in
comparison with those of some past eras.
92. See Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
(July 10, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-cost-of-compro
mise/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/68QK-JLFG; Richard A.
Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling is about the Conservative Imagination, SLATE
(June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_tab
le/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking
_down_the_law_is_all.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5UD-3P7V.
93. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 34, at 155–56, 197, 250–51, 383.
94. See Philip Taubman, Milton Kronheim’s, Where the Justices Adjourn for Lunch,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1979, at 36 (discussing frequent lunches attended by Justices Brennan
and Marshall and D.C. Circuit Judges Bazelon and Wright).
95. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 34–37 (2006); Peppers & Zorn, supra
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that found strong statistical relationships between the ideological
positions of Justices and the self-reported positions or partisan loyalties
of their clerks.97 Collectively, the respondents to these surveys served in
the Court over a long period of time, and the great majority of the
respondents served before the time that the ideological linkage between
judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks strengthened.98
Undoubtedly, the relationship between Justices’ and clerks’ views in
past eras had multiple sources. It stemmed in part from selectivity by
prospective clerks about where to send their applications.99 For their
part, the people who helped Justices select clerks (or, in some instances,
who selected clerks themselves) sometimes used ideological criteria
based on what they thought Justices wanted.100 Finally, Justices’ own
preferences surely played a direct role in producing the correlation
between the views of Justices and the views of their law clerks. Indeed,
there is scattered but substantial evidence that some Justices of past eras
sought out clerks who shared their ideological positions.101
Thus, there is some reason to doubt that affective polarization fully
accounts for the strengthening of the ideological linkage between judges
and Justices in the selection of law clerks. But what else could have
helped bring about this change? The most likely candidate is changes in

note 1, at 63–70. The Peppers and Zorn article reported the results of the survey reported in
the Peppers book, combined with a survey of law clerks who served in the 2001–2004 period.
96. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 103–07.
97. See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34–36; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105
tbl.2.17 & fig.2.3; Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 63, 64 fig.2.
98. See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34 (noting that respondents to the survey reported in
the book served during the period between 1940 and 2000 and that clerks whose Justices were
deceased responded at a higher rate); WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 10 (noting that
respondents served as law clerks during the period from the 1930s to the late 1990s); id. at 104
(showing that among the clerks who worked with Justices for whom at least five law clerks
responded to a question about their ideological position, 93 of 107 served with Justices whose
service ended in 1986 or earlier); Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that the law
clerks who were surveyed served between 1940 and 2004). The sharpest increase in the
strength of the relationship between Justices’ and judges’ ideological positions came in the
1990s. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
99. PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 57–58.
100. PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 120, 147–48, 152.
101. See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 147–48 (Chief Justice Warren); id. at 134 (Chief
Justice Vinson); WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 101, 105 tbl.2.7 & fig.2.3 (Justice
Douglas); id. at 103, 105 tbl.2.7 & fig.2.3 (Justice Brennan); Sean Donahue, Behind the Pillars
of Justice: Remarks on Law Clerks, 3 LONG TERM VIEW 77, 78 (1995) (noting “[a] few
Justices”).
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applications for Supreme Court law clerkships.102
There has been a massive growth in the number of applications for
clerkships that each Justice receives, from the few dozen a year that
some Justices reported in the late 1950s and early 1960s to something
like one thousand today.103 Thus, the Justices are more dependent on
others, such as current law clerks, to help them choose from the
applicants. Further, the Justices and those who help them face a far
more daunting task than they did in the past. As a result, information
about applicants that is both relevant and readily ascertained has
become more valuable. One such piece of information is the identity of
the lower court judge with whom an applicant has worked.
For the most part, the growth in the numbers of applications to each
Justice reflects a larger number of people who apply for clerkships. But
there has also been a change in the numbers of Justices to whom
aspiring clerks apply. For most of the time that Justices have employed
law clerks, prospective clerks (or the law professor sponsors who acted
on their behalf) applied to only a subset of the Justices, a subset chosen
in part on the basis of ideological preferences.104 But the growing
attractiveness of clerkships impelled aspirants to apply to larger
numbers of Justices, and it is now both standard practice and a norm to
send applications to all nine Justices.105
The exact timing of this change is uncertain, but data on the clerks
who worked with Justice Blackmun provide some sense of when it
became nearly complete.106 The clerks of the 1975–1985 Terms applied
to a mean of 6.8 Justices; the clerks of the 1986–1993 Terms applied to a
mean of 7.4.107 Although this is not a very large increase, the median
number of applications increased from 7 to 9.108 In other words, the
most common practice for the applicants who became Blackmun clerks
changed from omitting a few Justices to omitting none.

102. The discussion of the impact of change in application processes that follows draws
much from suggestions to me by Artemus Ward. See also WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39,
at 106–07.
103. Id. at 56–58.
104. See supra note 99.
105. PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 58–59; Tom
McCann, Clerks See Life on the Inside of the U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. LAW., Sept.
2003, at 20, 21.
106. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 59.
107. Id. at 59 tbl.2.I
108. Id.
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As discussed earlier, Justices may be attracted to the clerks of judges
whom they know personally and whom they respect highly.109 To the
extent that acquaintanceship and respect are products of ideological
agreement, increased reliance on the identity of lower court judges as a
basis for selection of law clerks would strengthen the ideological linkage
between judges and Justices in the selection process.
Meanwhile, once it became standard practice for aspirants to apply
to every member of the Court, a Justice could no longer infer from an
application that a prospective clerk agreed (or at least did not strongly
disagree) with the Justice’s views about public policy. In the absence of
changes in Justices’ ways of gathering information, the result might be to
reduce ideological agreement between Justices and their clerks.110 To
the extent that Justices care about such agreement, they must make
effective use of any available information sources. In the current era,
the ideological positions of some applicants are apparent from
membership in the Federalist Society or the American Constitution
Society or from other activities listed on their résumé. For other
applicants, the judge with whom a clerk has worked can provide
valuable information. If a Justice knows that a particular judge is
careful to choose only conservative clerks, for instance, the identity of
the judge tells a Justice a good deal. Further, a Justice can consult with
an ideologically similar judge to get assurance about a clerk’s views.
The same is true of the people who help Justices select their law
clerks. Current clerks or committees of former clerks might have direct
knowledge about the ideological positions of applicants.111 Their help
could make Justices less reliant on information such as the identity of
the judge with whom an applicant has worked. But these helpers may
themselves give considerable weight to that type of information.
Further, current and former clerks may help to perpetuate an
ideological linkage that already exists by favoring applicants who
worked with the same judge they did and whose ideological reliability
they can infer from that service.
Thus, a movement away from ideological behavior in applications
for clerkships to the Justices has given the Justices reason to engage in a
different form of ideological behavior, going to like-minded lower court

109. See supra Part III.
110. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 106–07.
111. Id. at 60–65.
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judges as sources of law clerks.112 Further, the broader growth in the
number of applications makes readily ascertainable information such as
the identity of the judge with whom an applicant has clerked more
valuable.113 If an applicant has no obvious markers of ideological
position, such as membership in the Federalist Society, and if the people
who help Justices select clerks have no personal knowledge of
applicants’ positions, the judge’s identity serves as a good substitute.
The relative importance of these two changes in applications—
growth in the number of applications and in the number of Justices to
whom aspirants apply—cannot be determined with certainty. Indeed,
an argument could be made for the dominance of either change. But
the more persuasive argument may be for the second change. When
prospective clerks applied selectively, Justices and those who help them
select clerks could infer that applicants saw themselves as ideologically
compatible with the Justices they selected. Once it became the standard
practice to apply to all the Justices, that inference was no longer
possible.
In turn, other sources of information on ideological
compatibility, including the identity of the judge with whom an
applicant worked, became considerably more valuable.
No matter which of these changes was more important, the two
changes appear to be an important cause of the strengthened ideological
linkage between judges and Justices. But are they the only source of
that strengthening?
I think the answer is no. For one thing, in light of the affective
polarization that has occurred among elites in general, it seems unlikely
that students at the most prestigious law schools and federal judges—
including Supreme Court Justices—have been immune to that
polarization.
Further, there is some suggestive evidence that the clerks who work
with liberal and conservative Justices in the current era differ from each
other more sharply than did their counterparts in past eras. The surveys
by Peppers and Zorn and by Ward and Weiden found statistical
relationships between the ideological positions of the Justices and the
positions and party affiliations of the law clerks who worked with them
in past eras.114 But the surveys also found that the law clerks as a group

112. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
113. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 58.
114. See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35–37; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105
tbl.2.17 & fig.2.3; Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 63–64.
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in these past eras leaned toward the left.115 Indeed, among the Justices
for whom there were sufficient survey responses from former clerks to
be included in tables, the more conservative Justices typically had a
majority of clerks who identified themselves as Democrats—in some
instances, a large majority.116 Similarly, the mean ideological position of
the clerks who worked with most of the conservative Justices was to the
left of center.117 In light of the expressed preferences of some of today’s
conservative Justices for conservative clerks118 and the backgrounds of
some of those clerks,119 it seems very likely that their clerks as a group
are predominantly Republican and conservative.120 It might well be that
the more conservative Justices of the 1950s and the 1970s were relatively
moderate compared with today’s conservatives. Even so, it appears that
there is a closer ideological match between Justices and clerks today
than there was in those earlier eras.121
Also relevant are the patterns of post-Court careers for law clerks,
compiled and analyzed by William Nelson and his colleagues.122 Their
study found that in the current era, unlike past eras, there is a strong
tendency for the clerks who work with conservative and liberal Justices
to take different career paths after their service on the Court.123 Clerks
for liberal Justices tend to go to positions in elite law schools,
Democratic administrations, and law firms with liberal orientations;
clerks for conservative Justices tend to go to Republican administrations
and firms with conservative orientations.124
Because of this
development, the study authors note, clerks for liberal and conservative
Justices now tend to differ in the ideological coloration of what they do

115. See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105
tbl.2.17; Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 60.
116. See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34–35, 37 tbl.2.8.
117. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 104 tbl.2.16, 105 tbl.2.17.
118. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
120. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the one strongly
conservative Justice in the two books’ listings who served into the 1990s, was also the only
Justice who had a majority of Republican law clerks and the only one whose clerks leaned
distinctly to the conservative side of the ideological spectrum. PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35,
37 tbl.2.8; see WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105 tbl.2.17.
121. See Liptak, supra note 18.
122. Nelson et al., supra note 18, at 1780–95.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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both before they get to the Court (including the ideological orientations
of the lower court judges they serve) and after they leave it.125
These pieces of evidence certainly are not conclusive. But they
suggest that the clerks who work with liberal Justices and those who
work with conservative Justices have become more distinct from each
other in ideological terms. That development probably could not have
occurred unless Justices gave more weight to ideology in their selection
of law clerks, and increased reliance on the ideological positions of
lower court judges as a criterion for selection would be an attractive
means to that end.
Thus, while no definitive answer is possible, I think that both
affective polarization and changes in the numbers of applications for
clerkships and the application practices of aspiring Supreme Court law
clerks help to account for the strengthened ideological linkage between
judges and Justices. If that judgment is accurate, it is likely that these
two sources have reinforced each other rather than operating separately.
That reinforcement could help to explain what has been a quite
substantial change in the Justices’ own practices in the selection of law
clerks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The tendency for Supreme Court Justices to draw their law clerks
from ideologically compatible lower court judges became considerably
stronger by the 1990s, and that tendency has remained very strong since
then.126 Regardless of how the strengthened ideological linkage between
judges and Justices is best explained, it is striking that the Justices of the
last two decades have drawn their law clerks so heavily from lower court
judges who share their general ideological positions.127 This reliance
strongly suggests that the Justices (or, at least, most of the Justices)
think of themselves as standing on one ideological side or the other, and
it suggests as well that they care a good deal about choosing clerks who
share their point of view.

125. Id. at 1797–98.
126. See supra Part II.
127. See supra Part III.
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If at least some Justices and their clerks function in part as an
ideological team,128 one result might be to heighten Justices’ reluctance
to deviate from the positions that are identified with their side of the
ideological spectrum in the cases that have the highest stakes for
conservatives and liberals within and outside the Court. Another result
might be that Justices and their clerks encourage each other to take
uncompromising stands and to proclaim a Justice’s disagreements with
colleagues in strong terms,129 thereby exacerbating conflicts within the
Court. These possibilities are speculative, but they merit consideration.
The Justices’ selection of law clerks and the ways they employ their
clerks also merit consideration for the window that they provide on the
functioning of the Court. Law clerks are important participants in the
process of reaching decisions in the Court.130 For this reason, the
Justices’ choices concerning their clerks also tell us something about the
goals they seek to advance and the ways that they see their roles. As I
have suggested in this Article, the development of a strong ideological
linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks tells us
something as well about the impact on the Court of changes in the world
of political and social elites in which both Justices and law clerks reside.

128 Some Justices appear to favor ideologically diverse sets of law clerks in a given Term
rather than sets in which all the clerks have the same ideological leanings as that of the Justice.
Kromphardt, supra note 9, at 309–10.
129. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 34, at 350–51, 438–39, 478–79 (discussing
interactions between Justice Brennan and his clerks); see also Kenney, supra note 62, at 221.
130. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

